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Summary. — This paper provides for a summary of facts which are indispensable
for nuclear waste disposal. Information is presented on types of radioactive wastes
and the origin, the waste treatment procedures and some characteristics of the waste
forms. Finally the various host rocks and the international disposal concepts are
discussed and the procedures for safety analyses are shortly described.
1. – Introduction
In 2016, 450 nuclear power plant units with an installed electric net capacity of about
392 GWelectric were in operation worldwide. Additional 60 plants with an installed capac-
ity of 60GW were under construction in 16 countries (https://www.euronuclear.org/
info/encyclopedia/n/nuclear-power-plant-world-wide.htm June 2017). In Eu-
rope, France has 58 units in operation, producing 63 GWel. The eﬃciency of a nuclear
power plant is in the range of 35%, and the average annual availability is about 80%.
A combined gas-steam power plant has an eﬃciency of about 60%. Nevertheless, the
nuclear power plants in France save annually the emission of 130 million metric tons of
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CO2 in comparison with the production by combined gas-steam power plant or about
280 million metric tons of CO2 produced by lignite ﬁred power plants (data taken from
https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=73&t=11, June 2017). For this reason,
nuclear power plays still an important role in preventing CO2 emissions. However, the
energy production by nuclear ﬁssion produces radioactive wastes. The mass and volume
of the nuclear waste is relatively small but due to its high radiotoxicity it needs to be
treated and disposed safely for very long periods of times.
2. – Origin, type and amount of radioactive wastes
Today, most of the nuclear power plant reactors are pressure water (PWR) or boiling
water (BWR) reactors. Both reactor types are light-water nuclear reactor. The main
diﬀerence between a BWR and PWR is that in a BWR, the reactor core heats water,
which turns to steam and then drives a steam turbine. In a PWR, the reactor core
heats also water, under elevated pressure. This hot water goes through steam generators
heating a lower-pressure steam system, which drives the turbine. A typical PWR (e.g.
Go¨sgen, CH) with a net electrical output 1010MW needs about 77 metric tons of fuel in
the core of the reactor. The enrichment of UO2 is in the range of 4.6–4.95% 235U. Every
year, parts of the fuel elements are replaced by fresh fuel and the other fuel elements are
transferred to diﬀerent locations in the reactor core according to their burn-up. The burn-
up is a measure for the energy produced per mass of initial fuel in gigawatt-days/metric
ton of heavy metal (GWd/tHM),
Typically, fuel elements remain in the nuclear power plant (NPP) for 4 cycles
(https://www.kkg.ch/upload/cms/user/KKG TB englisch 2016.pdf, June 2017). A
NPP generates almost 20 t of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) per year which need to be stored
in a water pool for several years. Figure 1 shows the design of a fuel rod, a photo of
a PWR fuel element (assembly) and pictures of the UO2 fuel after discharge from the
NPP.
The energy in a NPP is produced by ﬁssion of ﬁssile isotopes, such as the natural
isotope 235U. Only 0.7% of the natural uranium consist of the isotope 235U. The eﬀective
energy release by ﬁssion of 235U is about 205.4MeV per ﬁssion. This energy is distributed
between 2 ﬁssion products, recoil nucleus and 2 to 3 neutrons. The energy of the neutrons
is in the range between 0.1 and 10MeV which is too fast for keeping up a chain reaction.
In a LWR, ﬁssion is caused by neutrons in the thermal energy range. By interactions
with light atoms (hydrogen of the water) the ﬁssion neutrons are moderated to thermal
energies of 0.025 eV. It needs to be mentioned that ﬁssion can be generated also by
high-energy neutrons for example in fast reactors. Details of the neutron interactions
with matter, the interaction coeﬃcients for scattering, capturing and ﬁssion processes as
function of the neutron energy are given in the numerous text books on nuclear physics.
The mass distribution of the ﬁssion products resulting from the ﬁssile isotopes 233U,
235U and 239Pu are shown in ﬁg. 2. For a burn-up of 50 GWd/tHM, 5.5% of the initial
235U atoms are aﬀected. The formation of the ﬁssion products cause disturbances in
the crystal structure of the UO2 fuel, resulting in swelling and distortion of the UO2
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Fig. 1. – Design of a fuel rod (left), photo of a PWR fuel element assembled from fuel rods
(middle), fuel after discharge (right).
lattice, oxygen redistribution, reduction of heat conductivity, and changes in speciﬁc
heat, mechanical properties, formation of fractures and pores. The ﬁssion products
according ﬁg. 2 are characterized as follows:
– Noble gases (Kr and Xe) and other volatile ﬁssion products (FP).
– FPs dissolved as oxides in the UO2 matrix with adequate oxidized valence state.
– FPs forming metallic precipitates.
– FPs forming oxide precipitates
– Actinides dissolved as oxides in the fuel matrix.
If a thermal or epithermal (0.55–10 eV) neutron hits one of the majority uranium
atoms 238U, it can be captured forming 239U. This isotope is unstable and undergoes
beta decay (half-life 23.47min) forming 239Np. Also this isotope undergoes beta decay
(t1/2 = 2.355 days) forming 239Pu. This plutonium isotope has a half-life of 24 114 years
and is also ﬁssile. During the 4 years of the fuel in a NPP, 239Pu is formed and partly
burned. By neutron capture, also higher actinides are formed.
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Fig. 2. – Distribution of the main ﬁssion products as a function of the atomic number for 3 ﬁssile
isotopes.
From the chemical point of view, the spent nuclear fuel is one of the most complex
materials with respect to the elemental composition, the chemical state of the elements
and the heterogeneity. Information on the radioactivity of spent nuclear fuel is given in
ﬁg. 1.
3. – Reprocessing or direct disposal of spent nuclear fuel
After discharge of the UO2 fuel from a NPP with a burn-up of 50 GWd/tHM, the
spent fuel (SNF) contains still 0.8% 235U and about 1% 239Pu ﬁssile isotopes. Especially
in the 1960/1970ies when the total worldwide uranium resources were signiﬁcantly un-
derestimated, many states developed plans to retrieve the ﬁssile materials for further use
in NPPs. The objective was a closed fuel cycle with multiple reprocessing and reuse of
plutonium (see ﬁg. 3).
The reprocessing processing process is a complicated chemical procedure, dissolving
the UO2 fuel in hot, highly concentrated nitric acid. Afterwards, the acid solution which
contains the ﬁssion products, as well as some activation products, the actinides and the
complete mass of uranium is treated by the PUREX process. This is a chemical method
used to purify fuel for nuclear reactors or nuclear weapons. It is an acronym standing for
Plutonium Uranium Redox EXtraction. PUREX is the de facto standard aqueous nuclear
reprocessing method for the recovery of uranium and plutonium from used (“spent”, or
“depleted”) nuclear fuel. It is based on liquid-liquid extraction ion-exchange.
Reprocessing and re-fabrication of nuclear fuel with the remaining 235U and the plu-
tonium (closed fuel cycle) was considered as the most appropriate method. In the atomic
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Fig. 3. – Schematic view of the open and closed fuel cycles. (Picture taken from ENS, Euro-
pean Nuclear Society, https://www.euronuclear.org/info/encyclopedia/n/nuclear-fuel-
cycle.htm.)
law in Germany, until 1994 reprocessing of used fuel was promoted and direct disposal
was forbidden.
During the reprocessing of UO2 fuels diﬀerent waste streams are generated. These
comprise
– Fission gases,
– zircaloy cladding (hulls) of the fuel rods including the foot and end-pieces (solids);
– high-level radioactive waste in HNO3 solution (liquid);
– intermediate-level radioactive wastes mainly in acidic solutions (liquid);
– low-level radioactive wastes, HTO-bearing liquids, decontamination detergents
(liquid);
– solid wastes, e.g. ﬁlters, etc.
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Fig. 4. – International (left) and German classiﬁcation of radioactive wastes [1].
In the closed fuel cycle, the separated plutonium would be applied to produce mixed
uranium plutonium fuels (MOX) to be used in LWRs or in fast reactors.
4. – Classiﬁcation of wastes
Radioactive wastes do not only originate from reprocessing, but also during the op-
eration and decommissioning of NPP, from industrial use (sterilization, radiographic
techniques, etc.), from research and from medical applications. The nuclear waste classi-
ﬁcation applied In Germany is shown in ﬁg. 4, the radioactive wastes are classiﬁed with
respect to the heat release in a repository. Heat-producing waste comprises the solidiﬁed
high-level waste from reprocessing, hulls and end-pieces as well as SNF.
All wastes need to be transformed in a solid form before disposing.
4.1. High-level wastes. – For liquid high-level radioactive waste (HLW) from reprocess-
ing, the vitriﬁcation of the liquid is presently the method of choice. In Europe, vitriﬁed
HLW is/was produced by AREVA in La Hague, France, in Sellaﬁeld, UK and also at the
pilot reprocessing plant WAK in Germany. The molten glass is poured in stainless-steel
canisters of 150 l. The outcome of vitriﬁcation is a solid waste form with a content of
15–20wt.% of ﬁssion product oxides in a borosilicate matrix. Guarantee values of HLW
glass canisters are 3 × 1016 Bq of β/γ activity, 1.4 × 1014 Bq of α activity and a surface
dose rate of 1800Gy/h.
Zircaloy rod cladding (hulls), spacers etc. as well as foot and end-pieces of the fuel
elements are compacted and stored in the same type of canisters as the vitriﬁed waste.
In the European countries, diﬀerent package concepts for spent fuel elements were
developed. Well-known is the Swedish KBS-3 concept, where 12 complete fuel elements
are inserted in steel canisters which are surrounded by a 5 cm thick copper mantel. The
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Fig. 5. – Swedish KBS-3 concept: Disposal of a Cu-coated steel canister in a vertical drill
hole into the granitic host rock surrounded by clay buﬀer. (Picture taken from Wikipedia,
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:SKB KBS-3.jpg#file.)
Cu layer is considered to be stable under the Scandinavian granitic rock conditions for
several 100 000 years (see ﬁg. 5).
4.2. Intermediate- and low-level wastes. – Almost all countries distinguish between
long-lived and short-lived Intermediate- (ILW) and low-level waste (LLW). Liquid ILW
and LLW from reprocessing are concentrated by evaporation and the concentrates mainly
mixed with cement in order to form solid waste forms. Typically these waste forms
contain about 10wt.% of NaNO3 salts. In some facilities, the liquid ILW was incorporated
in bitumen. At the reprocessing plant in La Hague, France, the bituminization process
is replaced by a vitriﬁcation process using a “cold crucible” technology [2].
4.3. Operational wastes. – In LWRs, diﬀerent waste streams have to be treated. In
Germany, about 300m3 of radioactive wastes accumulate annually. The wastes include
solids, such as scrap metals, debris, organic materials (paper, plastic, etc.) and liquids
like oils, slurries, evaporator and ﬁlter concentrates and ion exchanger resins. The various
processing techniques aim at volume reduction, producing solid, compact and dry waste
products. The speciﬁc techniques and the resulting waste forms are shown in ﬁg. 6. For
combustible wastes a volume reduction by a factor of 50 is achieved from incineration.
In the case of compressible raw waste, a volume reduction by a factor of 2 to 5 can be
achieved [3]. Cementation is the preferred method for ﬁxation of radioactive liquids.
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Fig. 6. – Waste types and speciﬁc treatment techniques for LWR operational wastes.
4.4. Decommissioning wastes. – Decommissioning wastes represent a huge amount
of mass. The total mass of the radiation-controlled area of a large nuclear power plant
with a PWR is estimated to 156 500 t. About 143 000 t cover concrete structures. This
material can be almost completely conventionally recycled following removal of any sur-
face contamination. Only approximately 600 t of the concrete requires ﬁnal disposal as
radioactive waste. The mechanical installations —essentially piping and components—
including the entire steel construction (e.g. platforms and mountings) form a mass of
around 13 500 t in the radiation-controlled area of a PWR. Among these materials, only
around 3 000 t require disposal as radioactive waste and around 500 t as radioactive sec-
ondary waste (including from decontamination). The remaining 9800 t can likewise be
directly released or recycled after decontamination or melting-down [3]. During the de-
commissioning activities each material is analyzed with respect to radiation dose. In the
case that the dose is below a certain limit (which is expressed in Bq/g or Bq/cm3) for the
diﬀerent materials and structures such as debris, surfaces, buildings and scrap metal, the
materials can be disposed in conventional surface disposal or fed to re-use processes [4].
However, the diﬀerent European countries follow diﬀerent disposal concepts. In
France, all materials arising from decommissioning of nuclear facilities need to go to
speciﬁc disposal (very low waste disposal).
5. – Disposal – International disposal projects
An international consensus exists that long-lived highly radioactive and heat-
producing wastes should be disposed in a deep repository. However, ﬁnding a well-suited
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Fig. 7. – Comparison of important characteristics of potential host rocks.
site is a challenge. The siting process has to take into account a multitude of diﬀer-
ent aspects, scientiﬁc, social, economic and also ethical aspects. In most countries, the
import and export of radioactive wastes are not allowed. For this reason all countries
using nuclear power need to take decisions. A summary of the international approaches
for deep geological disposal of nuclear waste and the geological challenges in radioac-
tive waste isolation was published recently by Lawrence Berkeley and Sandia National
Laboratories in the USA (LBNL-1006984, 2016) [5]. It covers the disposal plans of 23
countries worldwide.
Before disposing HLW in a deep underground facility, the heat capacity has to decay
below a certain level. This is achieved by interim storage, in many cases for periods of
minimum 30 years. Of course, prolonged interim storage might be considered for example
in The Netherlands. The Dutch waste management organization COVRA has a license
for an interim storage facility for a period of 100 years.
Presently, three host rock types are under consideration for HLW and SNF. These are
rock salt which has been investigated in Germany and USA since decades. Crystalline
rocks, such as granite are available in Scandinavia and therefore this host rock was
selected for Swedish and Finnish disposal concepts. It is also under investigation in
Korea and China. In Belgium, an indurated clay rock formation (Boom clay) is under
investigation, whereas in Switzerland the Opalinus clay and in France the Callovo argillite
is selected. These two clay rocks consist of a mineral assemblage made of illite and calcite
as main components. In ﬁg. 7, some important features of the diﬀerent host rocks are
presented.
Figure 7 shows pros and cons of some general properties which, however, might vary
over the selected host rock formation. An intensive exploration of the site is required in
any case. Safety analyses performed for the diﬀerent host rocks and the related designs
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Fig. 8. – European disposal concepts. (Pictures taken from the public web pages of the
respective waste management organizations: a) Finland, picture taken from POSIVA OY, Fin-
land, http://www.posiva.fi/en/final disposal/final disposal facility/repository#.
WcDzaU1rymQ; b) France, picture taken from ANDRA, Agence nationale pour la ges-
tion des de´chets radioactifs, France, http://www.usinenouvelle.com/article/l-asn-a-
encore-des-reserves-sur-le-projet-cigeo-d-enfouissement-de-dechets-nucleaires-a-
bure.N573223; c) Sweden, Forsmark site, picture taken from SKB, Svensk Ka¨rnbra¨nslehantering
AB, http://www.skb.com/future-projects/the-spent-fuel-repository/; d) Sweden, LLW
and ILW repository SFR Sweden, picture taken from SKB, Svensk Ka¨rnbra¨nslehantering AB,
http://www.skb.com/our-operations/sfr/.)
of the repositories have shown that a safe disposal is feasible in all types of host rocks.
However, the speciﬁc multi-barrier system consisting of technical, geo-engineered and
natural barriers as well as the impact of each barrier on the disposal safety is diﬀerent
for the diﬀerent host rocks.
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Fig. 9. – Layout and general design of a HLW/SNF repository.
All reasonably discussed disposal concepts for HLW and SNF are based on mines in the
host rock. For disposal of heavy disposal casks access tunnels or shafts are foreseen. Some
disposal concepts need to demonstrate the possibility of retrieving the wastes for a certain
period of time (e.g. France, Germany), whereas other disposal concepts promote disposal
“in an irreversible manner” (Finland). It is clear that if the tunnels of a mine have to be
accessible over decades, speciﬁc layout and constructive measures have to be considered.
Figure 8a shows the planned Finnish HLW repository, start of operation is planned for
2025. The yellow square shows the disposal research mine ONKOLO, where site-speciﬁc
investigations are running. Figure 8b presents the French disposal concept Cige´o which
will be located in the Callovo-Oxfordinan clay formation. The license for construction is
expected in 2018, the operation could start after 2025. In the left corner of ﬁg. 8b, the
research mine at Bure is shown.
Figure 8c shows a photo of the selected site at Forsmark in Sweden, where the Swedish
waste management organization Svensk Ka¨rnbra¨nslehantering AB (SKB) will construct
the HLW repository. It is planned to start operation in 2030. Close to this location,
SKB operates the LLW/ILW disposal facility called SFR since 1988. In contrast to the
deep disposal concept for HLW, the SFR is situated 50 metres below the bottom of the
Baltic and comprises four 160-metre long rock vaults and a chamber in the bedrock with
a 50-metre high concrete silo for the most radioactive waste.
Figure 9 shows the design and general layout of repositories. The disposal mine is
generally located deep below the groundwater table which guarantees slow groundwater
movements and reducing conditions. The only exemption was the US disposal site at
Yucca Mountain in Nevada. This site is located in a desert with low precipitation rates
which caused problems with corrosion of canister materials.
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Fig. 10. – Final layout of the Belgian LLW surface disposal at Desel. (Picture taken from
ONDRAF·NIRAS, Belgium, https://www.ondraf.be/stockage-en-surface-%C3%A0-dessel.)
Today, deep borehole disposal concepts are under discussion in some countries
(5000m). The concepts are not suﬃciently developed and will not be further addressed
in this presentation.
For ILW and LLW, disposal in deep geological formations is considered in some coun-
tries only (e.g. Germany and Switzerland). Most countries use shallow surface disposals
(France, Belgium, Spain, . . . ) for short-lived radioactive wastes. Figure 10 shows the
layout of the Belgian LLW disposal at Dessel after ﬁnal closure of the site. The wastes
are stored in drums which are packed in concrete structures. These are placed in build-
ings which are ﬁnally covered by clay layers. This type of disposal should hold several
hundred years until the decay of the most abundant ﬁssion products 90Sr and 137Cs.
As already mentioned, the safety of repositories relay not only on the hostrock, but
also on a multi-barrier system. The barriers consist of constructions and materials with
the following properties:
– waste packages, cansisters, etc.;
– barrieres against penetration of groundwater;
– barriers against migration of radionuclides (sorption properties);
– chemical “buﬀering” (pH, redox, composition of solutions . . . );
– mechanical stability;
– heat conductivity (for HLW/SNF);
– decoupling of canister and hostrock (in the case of crystalline hostrocks).
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The barrier materials need to be designed according to the hostrock, groundwater
composition and the expected long-term evolution of the system.
6. – Safety analysis, data and models
Operating of an underground disposal requires a series of measures to guarantee the
orperational safety. One important aspect accounts for non-reactive waste forms (WIPP
accident 2014 [6,7]). The disposal of radioactive wastes in deep underground repositories
aims at a multitude long-term safety relevant features. These comprise:
– concentration of radiotoxic materials,
– isolation from biosphere,
– protection of environment and population,
– protection against intended and unintended access,
– safeguards (nonproliferation of ﬁssile materials).
Additionally, ethical and societal features are of high importance:
– passive safety,
– unattended (maintenance free),
– no burdens for future generations.
Due to the long half-lives of the actinides and some ﬁssion products (135Cs, 99Tc,
129I), these features have to be maintained over long periods of time. In Germany, safety
for 1 million years is claimed by law.
In the underground, below the groundwater table, water is omnipresent and contact of
water with the waste forms cannot be excluded completely. It is clear, that the diﬀerent
host rocks provide diﬀerent probabilities of water penetration to the wastes. From a
thermodynamic viewpoint, the components disposed of are not inert in contact with
water, but tend to react over long periods of time. The reactions include interactions
with backﬁll/buﬀer materials, corrosion of canister materials, and leaching and corrosion
of the waste itself. Safety assessment is based on models which simulate the whole suite
of possible processes in a disposal including corrosion, waste form behavior, radionuclide
mobilization and retention. The reactions and reaction rates depend on the availability
of the relevant reactants, inter alia of water and groundwater constituents. Both, the
transport of water and of radionuclides is aﬀected by reactions causing alterations of the
mineralogy and consequently of the porosity and permeability of near-ﬁeld barriers. It
is clear that the models require reasonable understanding and databases.
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Fig. 11. – Experiments with SNF in the shielded boxes at KIT-INE.
6.1. Alteration/Corrosion of waste forms.
HLW glass
The mechanism of glass dissolution is primarily driven by two main reactions that are
opposed to one another: These are the parallel reactions of “matrix dissolution” of the
glass and “water diﬀusion/hydration of the glass matrix/ion exchange reactions” [8]. The
fastest process is the rate-dominating process in parallel reactions, whereas in sequential
reactions, the slowest reaction governs the rate. The combination of the processes lead
to consecutive regimes of glass alteration having diﬀerent reaction rates. First, the for-
mation of the gel layers and/or the accumulation of glass constituents in solution, later
the formation of secondary phases take place and the glass corrosion rate decreases. with
time. Radionuclides distributed homogeneously in the glass matrix are released. Soluble
elements remain dissolved in the attacking water, less soluble elements react according
to their thermodynamic potentials forming solids or being sorbed onto solid phases.
SNF
In contrast to HLW glass, radionuclides in the SNF are not distributed homoge-
neously. There exist segregated phases containing easily soluble elements such as Cs,
and I, metallic phases with noble metals and Mo and the oxide phases which contain
oxidized plutonium and rare-earth elements. The release behavior of the segregated
elements has been investigated, e.g. [9-13]. It needs to be mentioned that these inves-
tigations require heavy shielding and radiation protection (ﬁg. 11). A summary of the
long-term radionuclide release form SNF under reducing conditions in deep repository is
given by Metz et al. [14]. The long-term radionuclide release is aﬀected by α-radiolytical
processes, the availability of hydrogen and the presence of dissolved elements interacting
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Fig. 12. – Oxidation states and electron conﬁguration of the disposal relevant actinide elements.
with radiolytical compounds (Cl−, Br−). The α-radiolytical processes depend on the
speciﬁc α-activity of the SNF which decays with time [15].
Cemented waste forms
Cemented waste forms are produced using relatively high water to cement ratios which
are representative for the pore system of the cement matrix. Groundwater penetrates
into the pore system and starts leaching of soluble components such as the portlandite
(Ca(OH)2). Depending on ﬂow-through processes, the whole portlandite might be dis-
solved causing a decrease of the pH in the cement pores. As a consequence, the main
constituents of the hardened cement the calcium-silicate phases are no longer stable and
decompose [16]. In the case of contact of cement products with magnesium chloride
brines, the decomposition rate is no longer controlled by diﬀusion but by Ca-Mg ex-
change reactions. This reaction shows a much faster degradation of cemented waste
forms [17]. Soluble elements (Cs) are released quickly, in cement incorporated actinides
are dissolved according their thermodynamic properties [18].
6.2. Solubility and complexation of radionuclides. – As already mentioned, actinides
show low solubility under the prevailing pH and redox conditions. Figure 12 shows the
potential oxidation states and electron conﬁguration of some actinide elements. Each of
these valence states has own solid phases and complexation properties with groundwa-
ter constituents. For prediction of the actual radionuclide concentrations in the speciﬁc
groundwater, thermodynamic data are required. Besides the measurement of the concen-
trations, the kind of complexes, their charge, pH and ionic strength dependence need to
be quantiﬁed exactly. An important tool is the time resolved laser ﬂuorescence spectrom-
etry TRLFS (see ﬁg. 13). The solubility controlling solid phases must be characterized
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Fig. 13. – Laser spectroscopic characterization of dissolved and sorbed species at KIT-INE.
be diﬀerent methods such as X-ray diﬀractometry or extended X-ray absorption ﬁne
structure measurements (EXAFS) and related methods.
Due to the strong sorption capacity of the actinides, the elements might sorb onto
groundwater colloids or form eigen-colloids. Speciﬁc techniques have been developed
for detection and quantiﬁcation of the colloids (e.g. Laser-induced breakdown detection
LIBD).
6.3. Sorption onto artiﬁcial and natural barrier materials. – Radionuclides can be
sorbed onto the diﬀerent solid materials of the barriers. The sorption processes comprise
– ion-exchange reactions,
– surface complexation reactions (outer and inner surface complexes),
– surface precipitation by co-precipitation and by redox controlled processes.
The sorption coeﬃcients are strongly inﬂuenced by the pH of the groundwater and
the dissolved ligands such as carbonate. It is also clear that sorption takes place onto the
surfaces of the solids. The sizes and properties of the surfaces play an important role.
For this reason, the sorption data bases (e.g. Vandergraaf [19]) can hardly be transferred
to diﬀerent systems. Sorption data need to be determined site speciﬁcally.
For quantiﬁcation of the sorption processes and characterization of the relevant surface
complexes highly sophisticated methods are required. These techniques include X-ray
photoelectron spectroscopy, XPS, TRLFS and EXAFS/XANES.
6.4. Transport processes. – The migration of radionuclides from deep repositories to
the biosphere is facilitated by transport in water. Transport of gaseous radionuclides
is possible only under very speciﬁc conditions. Diﬀusion of radionuclides in water is
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certainly the slowest process. Advectively driven processes are signiﬁcantly faster. The
following mechanism might trigger the water/radionuclide transport:
– thermal convection,
– density driven convective ﬂow,
– forced ﬂow as consequence of gas formation,
– forced ﬂow as consequence of volume changes.
One can expect that the design and the barrier system of a HLW repository would
prevent thermal and density driven ﬂow processes, also the changes of open volumes
by swelling (clay) or convergence (rock salt) are relatively slow processes and can be
evaluated reasonably.
As the repository system evolves, gases may be produced, such as hydrogen from the
corrosion of metals and from the radiolysis of water, and radon from the radioactive decay
of some of the waste. If present, biodegradable wastes can also produce carbon dioxide
and methane. Understanding how these gases move in a repository setting was a topic
of the Euratom FORGE project, which studied key gas migration issues in repository
performance assessment (https://www.bgs.ac.uk/forge/).
6.5. Models and safety analysis. – Demonstration of the safety of a nuclear waste
disposal requires numerical model calculations. However, in this context models results
are representative only for the aspect for which the model has been developed. Extrap-
olations beyond the parameter range on which the model is based are not possible. This
is also true for the parameter used in the calculations. Besides reasonable models one
has also to deal with natural processes and unpredictive human activities. Further the
models as well as the data have uncertainties which need to be addressed.
Deterministic safety analysis
For safety analysis speciﬁc tools are used. As the future is unknown, safety analyses
are build-up on the concept of scenarios. This concept representing the deterministic
safety analysis is demonstrated in ﬁg. 14. In a ﬁrst step, a selection of the features,
events, and processes (FEP) is required. The FEP should cover all conceivable facts and
ﬁgures of the disposal system including wastes, barriers and hostrock. Relevant FEP
can be selected from FEP databases or from site speciﬁc information. A scenario is
constructed by combination of the selected FEPs. A common deﬁnition is as follows:
“A scenario is speciﬁed by a combination of some FEPs which characterize one potential
evolution of the disposal system”. Especially in the case of an incidence scenario, the
initiating FEP is of high importance.
After the combination of the FEPs to form a scenario, a model is developed, mainly
as a numerical code. Initial and boundary conditions as well as model parameters are
derived from site-investigation or from experimental data with wastes, barriers, etc. This
process delivers results for a multitude of scenarios and realizations with diﬀerent sets
of parameters. Figure 14 shows the diﬀerent steps which are required for deducing the
long-term performance and the resulting dose rates from FEPs and scenarios.
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Fig. 14. – Scenario: From FEP to performance assessment and safety analysis.
One important question is concerned with the weighting of the results to be used for
safety analysis. This can be done by probabilistic tools.
Probabilistic Safety Analysis
Probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) is an established technique to numerically quan-
tify risk measures in nuclear power plants. It is also applied for disposal safety analysis.
PSA comprises a model of the disposal, in which all safety relevant systems are modelled
and logically linked together to determine the overall likelihood of radionuclide release
and the dose to man(1). System failures are identiﬁed and quantiﬁed by models like
Fault Trees (FT) which deduce logical combinations of the FEPs. At the lowest level,
the FEPs of the fault trees are assigned probability distributions. These probability dis-
tributions are propagated up through the tree logic to reach a probability distribution
of the top event. The PSA methodology is a logical, deductive technique which speciﬁes
an undesired top event and uses fault trees and event trees to model the various parallel
and sequential combinations of processes that might lead to an undesired event such
as radionuclide release. The number of combinations that might lead to this incident
increases exponentially with the number of modelled components. Consequently, eﬀec-
tive computer codes and quantiﬁcation techniques are necessary to solve any large scale
problem. The PSA models are traditionally built from logical Boolean expressions. In
PSA such logical expressions are typically based on coupled event tree models. Event
trees (ET) depict the potential event sequences from the initiating event to the associ-
(1) The detriment adjusted nominal risk coeﬃcient for cancer and hereditary eﬀects by radiation
is 0.057 per Sv [20].
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Fig. 15. – TSPA Model Architecture. (Picture taken from C. W. Hansen et al., San-
dia National Laboratories, USA, http://energy.sandia.gov/wp-content//gallery/uploads/
SAND2010-3754C.pdf.)
ated consequences. The ET begins with the initiating event. An initiating event (IE)
could be failure of a barrier. For the Total System Performance Assessment (TSPA) of
the Yucca Mountain, four questions were underlying the probabilistic safety analysis:
1. What events and processes can take place at the facility?
2. How likely are these events or processes?
3. What are the consequences of these events or processes?
4. How certain are the answers to the ﬁrst 3 questions?
The complexity of the TSPA model architecture is shown in ﬁg. 15. (GoldSim is a
dynamic, probabilistic simulation software developed by GoldSim Technology Group.)
7. – Conclusions
It was shown that various types of radioactive wastes originating from the nuclear
fuel cycle, direct disposal of used fuel elements, or from industry, research and medicine
can be treated in a way that the ﬁnal products are suited for disposal. Depending
on the classiﬁcation of the wastes, diﬀerent disposal strategies have been or will be
implemented in the European countries. For the high-level radioactive wastes consensus
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exist to dispose of these wastes in deep underground facilities. Due to the diﬀerent
geologic settings of the countries, diﬀerent host rocks can be selected. In few countries,
such as in Germany, several suited host rock formations are available.
Development and demonstration of safe disposal of radioactive wastes is a multi-
disciplinary task requiring experiences from nuclear physicists, chemists, geologists, min-
ing engineers and many more scientiﬁc disciplines. However, even if a disposal concept
sounds scientiﬁcally and technically reasonable and safe, it must be accepted by the
society and by the population living close to the site.
The safe isolation of the wastes from the environment over the long periods of time
can be demonstrated by model calculations and safety analyses. Deterministic and prob-
abilistic procedures for safety analyses are described. Scientists may accept the method-
ologies, can review the models and databases as well as evaluate the conclusions drawn
from the experimental ﬁndings on which the data were determined. Of course, diﬀerent
opinions of scientists exist. These diﬀerent opinions can be disputed on a scientiﬁc level.
However, it is necessary to communicate the concepts, analyses and results to the society
including politicians, the population at the site and action groups. The communication
of scientiﬁc facts and data is extremely complicated: Breaking facts and ﬁgures down to
easily understandable statements for the public could be misinterpreted by the scientiﬁc
community. In the context of safe disposal of nuclear wastes the communication to the
public is indispensable and procedures resolving this deﬁcit need to be developed.
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